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Local 1’s Unionism  
and the Transformation  
of Iowa’s Politics, 1939–1970 
WILSON J. WARREN 
The following article is reprinted with permission from Struggling 
with “Iowa’s Pride”: Labor Relations, Unionism, and Politics in 
the Rural Midwest since 1877, by Wilson J. Warren (University of 
Iowa Press, 2000). It is reprinted here because it aptly complements the 
other two articles in this issue, expanding and providing context for 
their narratives.  
 Previous chapters in the book recounted the emergence and erosion 
of a militant unionism in Local 1 of the United Packinghouse Workers 
of America, which represented workers at the John Morrell and Com-
pany meatpacking plant in Ottumwa.—Editor 
 
LOCAL 1’S MILITANT UNIONISM keyed Iowa’s political 
transformation in the post–World War II years. Morrell workers’ 
CIO movement quickly moved beyond plant organizing and 
bargaining with the company into a larger political struggle for 
greater power in city and state politics. Ottumwa’s meatpacking 
workers, together with other blue-collar workers and middle-
class residents of the city, became Democratic supporters who 
precipitated a remarkable transition in partisan politics in Ottum-
wa, Wapello County, and Iowa as a whole. Indeed, Ottumwa’s 
CIO movement, combined with meatpacking, auto-worker, and 
farm equipment worker unionism across the state, helped to 
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transform Iowa’s political landscape from solid Republicanism 
to competitive two-party status.1 
 This Democratic transition started in the 1930s but did not cul-
minate until the 1960s. As historian James L. Sundquist describes 
in Dynamics of the Party System, the Democratic ascendancy in 
Iowa and ﬁfteen other northern states was part of a two-stage re-
alignment that spanned the 1930s to the 1950s. Developments 
among packing workers in Ottumwa illustrate these ﬁndings 
quite well. The packing community’s enthusiasm for unionism 
in the 1930s did not immediately carry over into support for the 
Democratic party. From the 1860 presidential election until 1928, 
Ottumwa and Wapello County were usually dependable Repub-
lican strongholds in local, state, and national politics, not unlike 
most of Iowa’s cities and counties. Only during the late nine- 
teenth century and then during World War I had Democrats en-
joyed success in Ottumwa and Wapello County. Unlike the situ-
ation in other industrial cities elsewhere, the 1928 presidential 
election results did not presage later Democratic landslides; Hoo-
ver drubbed Smith in the packing district’s Ward One by a 60 to 
40 percent margin. Beginning with the 1932 presidential election, 
however, Iowa Democrats in both urban and rural areas won by 
landslide margins in the 1932, 1934, and 1936 national and state 
elections. As in so many midwestern states, though, Democratic 
gains largely reﬂected farmers’ protest voting. By 1938, with the 
New Deal agricultural programs addressing farm problems, 
Democratic gains declined throughout most of Iowa, even in the 
industrial cities. Although the Democrats received majorities in 
                                                 
1. The standard argument, expressed especially by Harlan Hahn, is that Iowa’s 
Democratic transition rested with both its farmers and urban residents (defined 
as cities with over 10,000 population). Hahn attributes the support for Demo-
cratic candidates among urban residents owing mainly to issues of taxation, 
liquor control, and legislative reapportionment. Neither he nor James Larew, 
though the latter is more generous in crediting labor’s assistance, focus centrally 
on the contribution of Iowa’s growing labor union movement to the Democratic 
tradition. Shelton Stromquist’s synthesis of oral histories on Iowa’s labor move-
ment suggests this connection, but it is not systematically examined. See Harlan 
Hahn, Urban-Rural Conflict: The Politics of Change (Beverly Hills, CA, 1971); 
James C. Larew, A Party Reborn: The Democrats of Iowa, 1950–1974 (Iowa City, 
1980); Shelton Stromquist, Solidarity and Survival: An Oral History of Labor in the 
Twentieth Century (Iowa City, 1993), 282–94; and Dorothy Schwieder, Iowa: The 
Middle Land (Ames, IA, 1996), 290–91. 
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Ottumwa and Wapello County during the early 1930s, the pack-
ing community did not turn out for Roosevelt to a much greater 
degree than the rest of the city’s voters.2 
 With the 1936 election, though, Ottumwa’s industrial work-
ers’ selections foretold the signiﬁcant swing to the Democratic 
ticket by voters in industrial communities in the state after World 
War II. Between 1944 and 1972, the original packing district and 
the south side precincts (where even larger numbers of Morrell 
workers lived after World War II, and who were joined by work-
ers at the UAW-afﬁliated Deere plant) averaged 65 and 60 per-
cent majorities, respectively, for Democratic presidential candi-
dates. Even more signiﬁcant, the residents of Ottumwa and 
Wapello County as a whole voted solidly Democratic for not 
only presidential candidates but congressional and state-level 
politicians as well. From 1932 to 1948, Democrats won 52 percent 
of Wapello County and Ottumwa’s gubernatorial vote. Between 
1950 and 1972, Democrats garnered 58 percent of the total vote 
in Wapello County, and 59 percent of the vote in Ottumwa dur-
ing the same period. From the Civil War to 1954, only two Dem-
ocrats had occupied the governor’s ofﬁce in Iowa, Horace Boies 
in 1889 and 1891 and Clyde Herring in 1932 and 1934. With vot-
ers in Ottumwa and Wapello County leading the way and con-
tributing to concerted urban support across the state, Democrats 
Herschel Loveless, an Ottumwa native with working-class roots, 
and former trucker Harold Hughes won the governor’s seat ﬁve 
times between 1956 and 1966.3 
 Accompanying the transformation of voting behavior was 
the direct political participation of workers from Morrell and 
                                                 
2. James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment 
of Political Parties in the United States, rev. ed. (Washington, DC, 1983), 256–57; 
Larew, A Party Reborn, 7; State of Iowa, Official Register, 1933–1934 (Des Moines, 
1933); and State of Iowa, Official Register, 1941–1942 (Des Moines, 1942). Regard-
ing the designation of Ottumwa’s Ward One, beginning in the 1932 election, 
Ward One was reconstituted as Precincts One and Two. I have generally retained 
use of the designation First Ward (or Ward One) for the sake of continuity with 
earlier chapters. Although part of the two-stage realignment, Iowa obviously still 
lagged behind the political revolution wrought by the Democrats in much of the 
rest of the urban Midwest and Northeast as early as the 1920s. See Richard Oes-
treicher, “Urban Working-Class Political Behavior and Theories of American 
Electoral Politics, 1870–1940,” Journal of American History 74 (March 1988), 1257–86. 
3. State of Iowa, Official Registers, 1933–34 through 1973–74. 
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other industries in Ottumwa in city and state politics. From the 
1940s to mid-1950s several union members ran for various city, 
county, and state ofﬁces, and assumed leading roles in the union-
organizing campaigns of other plants around the region. Union 
representatives from Ottumwa were especially instrumental in 
the union drive at the Rath Packing Company plant in Waterloo, 
a somewhat larger manufacturing city in northeast Iowa. Home 
to Iowa’s two largest factories, Rath and John Deere, both CIO 
organized, Waterloo would emerge in the late 1940s and early 
1950s as the other leading CIO locale in the state. Constituting 
the largest bloc of union members in the state’s CIO council, 
Waterloo and Ottumwa representatives, working together with 
other representatives from the state’s packinghouse and auto 
worker unions, would promote the political action programs that 
would transform Iowa’s Republican-dominated political estab-
lishment into a much more balanced two-party system by the 
1960s. 
 The transformation of voting behavior and workers’ direct 
political participation were mutually reinforcing in Ottumwa 
through the 1950s. Union leaders, motivated by the same desire 
for power and control that had sparked most of their union ob-
jectives in the plant in the 1930s and 1940s, also ran for political 
ofﬁces to gain a more direct role in community affairs. For union 
leaders, achieving greater inﬂuence in the community was just 
as important as it was in plant affairs. Their concerns were also 
increasingly expressed in the voting behavior of rank-and-ﬁle 
unionists as well as signiﬁcant segments of Ottumwa’s popula-
tion as a whole. As local union achievements became increas-
ingly linked to those of other unions in the industry and around 
the Midwest by the mid-1940s, Morrell-Ottumwa workers’ polit-
ical horizons became likewise broader. From the mid-1940s to the 
early 1950s, as workers battled with Morrell’s management for 
control in key production decisions, they also struggled for 
power in local and state political arenas. 
 Local 1 was at the forefront of Iowa’s Democratic transition 
long before the post–World War II years. Beginning in 1940, union 
members registered large numbers of new voters in Wapello 
County. Then in fall elections of that year, Ottumwa gave Roose-
velt his largest percentage victory among all Iowa’s industrial 
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cities.4 With the organization of the CIO’s political action commit-
tee (PAC) in 1944, workers participated signiﬁcantly in local Dem-
ocratic party campaigns. From 1946 through the 1960s, Ottumwa 
workers’ central role in shaping the Iowa-Nebraska States, later 
Iowa State, Industrial Union Council’s CIO-PAC efforts and then 
the merged AFL-CIO Iowa State Federation of Labor’s state-level 
political efforts resulted not only in consistent Democratic victo-
ries in local and county politics, but also helped to secure Demo-
cratic successes at the state and national level by the 1960s. 
 
Building a “Union Politic” in Ottumwa 
In 1885, Republican orator, later U.S. senator, Jonathan P. Dol-
liver claimed that “Iowa will go Democratic when Hell goes 
Methodist.” In fact, Republicans did not dominate Iowa’s politics 
until after the turn of the twentieth century. For much of the late 
nineteenth century, struggles among the various groups that had 
settled the state, including Yankees, upland southerners, and for-
eigners, particularly Germans, over racial equality and Prohibi-
tion made Democrats and Republicans fairly evenly matched. 
Ottumwa generally reﬂected the state’s diverse ethnocultural mix 
and political heritage from the mid–nineteenth century through 
the 1920s. Although populated by some Irish and German Cath-
olic immigrants, Ottumwa’s Democratic supporters in the late 
nineteenth century were often American-born with roots in the 
South, unlike Dubuque, where Irish and German Catholics 
turned that city into a major center of Democratic party support. 
Situated in the southern half of Iowa where upland southerners 
were among the earliest settlers, from its earliest years Ottum-
wa’s working class demonstrated a noticeable tendency to vote 
more Democratic than the city as a whole. In the 1856 presiden-
tial election, Wapello County, like several of the counties in the 
two southernmost tiers of the state, returned majorities for the 
Democratic candidate, James Buchanan.5 
                                                 
4. Among Iowa’s industrial cities in 1940, Roosevelt won 58 percent of the vote 
in Ottumwa, followed by Fort Dodge with 56 percent, Davenport, Mason City, 
and Sioux City each with 54 percent, Waterloo with 52 percent, Dubuque and 
Des Moines with 49 percent. See State of Iowa, Official Register, 1941–42. 
5. Dolliver quoted in Hahn, Urban-Rural Conflict, 17. On the cultural streams of 
Iowa settlers, see Hahn, Urban-Rural Conflict, 35–36; Nicole Etcheson, The Emerging 
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 Yet beginning with the 1860 presidential election through 
1928, the majority of Ottumwa and Wapello County voters, like 
Iowa’s voters in general, normally turned out for the Grand Old 
Party. Although Ottumwa’s working-class voters, particularly 
those in the Ward One packing district, did vote more strongly 
for Democrats between 1888 and 1936, the difference between 
their turnouts compared to those for the rest of the city’s voters 
was generally only a few percentage points. Ottumwa and Wa-
pello County voters also demonstrated a somewhat higher pro-
clivity to vote for third-party candidates, especially Socialists and 
Progressives though not Populists, resulting in somewhat lower 
percentage returns for Republicans than the state as a whole, but 
otherwise there was little signiﬁcant difference between Ottum-
wa, Wapello County, and Iowa in Democratic voting tendencies 
during this period. The Republican party’s dominance in Wa-
pello County before the 1930s is also evident when looking at 
county elected ofﬁcials. Between 1898 and 1932, only during the 
period from 1906 to 1912 were there more Democratic ofﬁcials 
than Republicans in Wapello County.6 
                                                 
Midwest: Upland Southerners and the Political Culture of the Old Northwest, 1787–
1861 (Bloomington, IN, 1996), 2, 109–27; Morton M. Rosenberg, Iowa on the Eve 
of the Civil War: A Decade of Frontier Politics (Norman, OK, 1972), 18–23; John C. 
Hudson, Making the Corn Belt: A Geographical History of Middle-Western Agricul-
ture (Bloomington, IN, 1994); Jon Gjerde, The Minds of the West: Ethnocultural 
Evolution in the Rural Middle West, 1830–1917 (Chapel Hill, 1997), 4–5; and Robert 
R. Dykstra, Bright Radical Star: Black Freedom and White Supremacy on the Hawkeye 
Frontier (Cambridge, MA, 1993), vii. On Iowa’s politics in the late nineteenth 
century, see Schwieder, Iowa, 31–32, 72–73, 76–77, 211–29; Larew, A Party Re-
born, 1–9; Dykstra, Bright Radical Star, 58, 63, 108, 120–23, 250–54, 261; and Jeffrey 
Ostler, Prairie Populism: The Fate of Agrarian Radicalism in Kansas, Nebraska, and 
Iowa, 1880–1892 (Lawrence, KS, 1993), 37–53, 138–42. On Wapello County’s 
nineteenth-century demographics and politics, see Dykstra, Bright Radical Star, 
145; Mildred Throne, “A Population Study of an Iowa County in 1850,” Iowa 
Journal of History (October 1959), 314–18; and 1895 Iowa Census Manusript. 
6. Voting data on Ottumwa and Wapello County were obtained from State of Iowa, 
Official Registers, 1890 to 1931–32. The two exceptions to Ward One’s slightly 
higher level of Democratic support compared to the rest of the city in this period 
occurred in 1916 and 1926. Ward One’s voters cast a higher percentage for the 
Republican gubernatorial candidate, William Harding, in 1916 because of his 
anti-Prohibition campaign. In 1926, Republican Smith W. Brookhart, a progres-
sive Republican, captured 60 percent of the First Ward’s votes compared to just 
48 percent for Ottumwa. Brookhart campaigned particularly on behalf of eco-
nomic relief for Iowa’s hard-pressed farmers. This economic focus reflected 
Brookhart’s conscious rejection of the older state political focus on prohibition 
Unionism and Iowa’s Politics      77 
 The real watershed in the packing district’s voting behavior 
occurred with the 1936 presidential election. Although the pack-
ing district gave 56 percent to Roosevelt in 1932, Wapello County 
as a whole actually supported Roosevelt at an even higher rate 
of 57 percent. Indeed, the 1932 and 1934 gubernatorial and 1932 
U.S. Senate races demonstrated the same pattern. These results 
lend credence to Harlan Hahn’s argument that Roosevelt’s suc-
cess in Iowa’s 1932 presidential election was largely owing to ru-
ral protest votes. Across Iowa in 1932, farmers gave Roosevelt 70 
percent of their vote compared to just over 50 percent from resi-
dents of towns over 10,000. The returns from the packing district 
from 1936 on, however, were consistently higher for Democrats 
and markedly greater than that of the entire city or county, though 
the returns from these larger areas also showed consistently 
higher returns for Democrats.7 
 The underpinning of this Democratic transition in Ottumwa 
was the extension of workers’ struggles for greater power and 
control in the Morrell plant to the city as a whole. The 1939 strike 
and the shop-ﬂoor struggles that were endemic in the plant in the 
                                                 
and ethnocultural issues. It may be that Morrell workers looked to Brookhart, 
who would remain a Republican but was “a New Dealer before [there was] a 
New Deal,” more because of this economic focus, an area of concern that cer-
tainly would appeal to them during and after the New Deal, than its traditional 
concerns with Prohibition. On the 1916 gubernatorial race in Iowa, see Edward 
Franklin Cox, State and National Voting in Federal Elections, 1910–1970 (Hamden, 
CT, 1972); and John Thomas Schou, “The Decline of the Democratic Party in 
Iowa, 1916–1920” (M.A. thesis, University of Iowa, 1960), 112, 135–44, 251–79, 
302–7. Note that the 1921–22 Official Register did not provide detailed county-
level voting results. Only state and county totals are available for the 1920 elec-
tions. Wapello County and Ottumwa’s large return for Democrats in the 1924 
and 1930 U.S. Senate races probably was at least in part owing to the fact that 
Dan Steck was a native Ottumwan. On the 1926 senate race in Iowa, see George 
William McDaniel, Smith Wildman Brookhart: Iowa’s Renegade Republican (Ames, 
IA, 1995), 196–98, 270–73. The New Dealer label for Brookhart’s politics is by 
Claude Pepper and quoted in McDaniel, Smith Wildman Brookhart, 273. On third-
party support in Ottumwa and Wapello County, see Ottumwa Daily Democrat, 
8/12/1901; Ottumwa Morning Democrat, 9/6/1903; James Weinstein, The Decline 
of Socialism in America, 1912–1925 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1984), 44, 96, 116–18; 
David P. Thelen, Robert M. LaFollette and the Insurgent Spirit (Boston, 1976), 190. 
On the general lack of voter support for populists in Iowa, see Ostler, Prairie 
Populism, esp. 154–74. On socialism in Iowa, see William H. Cumberland, “The 
Red Flag Comes to Iowa,” Annals of Iowa 39 (1968), 453–54. 
7. State of Iowa, Official Registers, 1937–38 through 1973–74; and Cox, State and 
National Voting. 
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late 1930s and early 1940s made the larger political context for 
workers’ local workplace efforts more important. During the 
1940s and 1950s, workers’ forays into local politics mirrored the 
struggles within the plant. Workers running for local and state 
political ofﬁces often contested management representatives from 
the Morrell plant. As a consequence, while Local 1 struggled to 
gain union shop and dues check-off agreements in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s, the local also aggressively expanded its presence 
in Ottumwa’s politics and within Iowa’s CIO movement. 
 Over the course of the 1950s, however, as the militants 
among Local 1’s leadership lost favor among the new workers 
entering the plant, they also failed to capture support in commu-
nity political contests. The 1953 city elections saw the last attempt 
by Local 1 militants to contest for city council positions. During 
the same period, however, several members of the new genera- 
tion of Local 1 ofﬁcials, including Jack McCoy and David Hart, 
along with politically active members of the UAW local organized 
at the city’s growing John Deere plant, especially Jacob “Jake” 
Mincks, as well as a former Morrell worker, Herschel Loveless, 
would successfully contest for positions in city, state, and state 
labor politics. Instead of viewing local and state politics as an- 
other means of punishing management and gaining greater con-
trol in rapid fashion, as the militants tended to view politics, the 
new generation of labor leaders were in the fray for the long haul. 
They were willing to work within the political system to gain 
beneﬁts for their fellow workers in a way that appeared less com-
bative than the militants’ efforts and behavior. In particular, work-
ers who began their tenure at Morrell after World War II saw the 
new Local 1 leaders as less self-interested and vindictive. This 
perception translated into a wider appeal among other Ottumwa 
and Iowa voters when the new generation entered politics. 
 The central agency of Morrell workers’ political involvement 
was the Ottumwa Industrial Union Council (OIUC) created in 1939 
by Local 1. It quickly overshadowed the city’s AFL central labor 
body, the Trades and Labor Assembly (TLA). During the war 
years, animosity between the PWOC and Amalgamated in the 
Morrell plant mirrored the competition between the OIUC and 
TLA in part because Henry Hoover, leader of the small group of 
Amalgamated members in the Morrell plant and infamous 
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among Local 1 members for his attempted back-to-work move-
ment during the 1939 strike, served as TLA president. In Septem-
ber 1941, for example, competition between the two groups ﬂared 
into a ﬁerce struggle over union afﬁliation of the city’s truck driv-
ers. Local 1 had urged the members of the AFL-afﬁliated Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) truckers to join the CIO’s 
Motor Transport Drivers and Allied Workers, led by former IBT 
(and IUAW) leaders Farrell Dobbs, Carl Nilson, and the Dunne 
brothers, Trotskyites out of Minneapolis and Duluth, Minnesota, 
and Frank Cronin, a Waterloo-area organizer who later became a 
CIO regional director in Nebraska. Local 1 provided picketers at 
grocers still working with IBT truckers. When Local 1’s represent-
atives on the OIUC failed to give unanimous support to the chal-
lenge to the IBT, Local 1’s membership promptly asked for their 
representatives’ resignations. OIUC president Jack Woodrow, 
secretary Orvel Champ, Donald Jones, and Harold Whitney, all 
Local 1 members, then threw their support behind Nilson’s CIO 
efforts, but were nevertheless forced to step down because of 
pressure from Local 1’s membership. Because of developments in 
Ottumwa, Iowa-Nebraska CIO director Ben Henry pledged to 
throw the weight of the state union apparatus behind a move of 
the truckers into the CIO. Despite this support from Local 1 and 
the state CIO, the AFL won out over the CIO and signed a city-
wide contract to handle both motor and rail freight. Although un-
successful, the struggle over the truckers’ union afﬁliation dem-
onstrated the widespread militancy within Local 1 and the local’s 
commitment to larger union and political ﬁghts.8 
                                                 
8. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 9/2–5/1941, 9/8/1941, 9/12/1941, 9/18/1941, 9/22/ 
1941; Regular Meeting of September 17, 1941, of Local 3, UPWA Local P-3 Rec-
ords, 1939–1942 Minute Book, State Historical Society of Iowa (SHSI), Iowa City; 
Convention and Year Book, Iowa State Industrial Council, CIO, 1951, Iowa Fed-
eration of Labor (IFL), AFL-CIO Records, SHSI, Iowa City; Jacob “Jake” Mincks, 
interview with Iowa Labor History Oral Project (ILHOP), 10/18/1978 and 
10/27/1978, SHSI, Iowa City; and Proceedings, Fifteenth Annual Constitutional 
Convention, Iowa State Industrial Union Council, CIO, 1953, IFL, SHSI. Cronin 
addressed the 1953 convention, held in Ottumwa, by thanking union members 
for the support they gave him in August 1941 when the Iowa-Nebraska State 
Industrial Union Council was also held in Ottumwa, and the delegates solidly 
supported him even though he was from the “rebel” Teamsters group. See Pro-
ceedings, pp. 113–23. On the schism between the AFL and CIO branches of the 
Teamsters, see Arthur A. Sloane, Hoffa (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 18–31. On Carl 
Nilson’s IUAW roots, see Peter Rachleff, “Organizing ‘Wall to Wall’: The Inde- 
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 Both Local 1 and the OIUC supported candidates for local and 
state ofﬁces beginning in 1940. The experience of the 1939 Morrell-
Ottumwa strike convinced union leaders that they needed a more 
supportive city and county government. In 1940, Charles Sears, 
president of Local 1 in 1939, ran for a seat on the Ottumwa school 
board. Sears’s candidacy posed a test of union power against one 
of the incumbents running for reelection, recently retired Morrell 
superintendent and longtime worker enemy Ernest Manns. In the 
race to select members for three seats, Manns ﬁnished second and 
Sears came in fourth out of thirteen candidates. Interest in the elec-
tions, however, generated the highest turnout in a school board 
race in twenty years. In the next two months, Local 1 and the OIUC 
expanded on this interest by helping to boost voter registration 
in Wapello County before the May 1940 primaries. Their efforts 
added 1,625 new voters to the county rolls, an increase of more 
than 10 percent. That fall’s elections resulted in the Democrats’ 
sweep of local and state representative slots in Wapello County, a 
county safely Republican since the late nineteenth century.9 
 The impact of this 1940 voter registration campaign is also 
clearly evident when the total votes from the 1940 general elec-
tions are compared to earlier results. Whereas Ottumwa’s popu-
lation increased by 12 percent between 1930 and 1940, the total 
vote cast for the president went up 15 percent between 1936 and 
1940, and was up nearly 20 percent from 1932. The total number 
of votes cast for Roosevelt in the same periods was up 16 and 25 
percent in Ottumwa. At the county level, although the popu-
lation had increased by 9 percent between 1930 and 1940, total 
votes cast for the president in 1940 were up 13 percent over 1936 
and 20 percent since 1932. Correspondingly, Roosevelt received 
11 percent more votes in 1940 from Wapello County voters than 
in 1936 and 20 percent more than in 1932.10 
 In addition to entering local political contests and registering 
voters, Morrell-Ottumwa workers involved themselves early on 
                                                 
pendent Union of All Workers, 1933–1937,” in “We Are All Leaders’: The Alternative 
Unionism of the Early 1930s, ed. Staughton Lynd (Urbana, IL, 1996), 57–58, 65–66. 
9. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 2/28/1940, 3/12/1940, 5/24/1940, and 11/6/1940. 
10. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1950, vol. 1, Number of Inhab-
itants (Washington, DC, 1952); State of Iowa, Official Registers, 1933–34 through 
1941–42. 
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in a campaign to retain the structure of city government. Local 1 
activists saw the city’s commission form of government as poten-
tially responsive to working people if labor union members or 
other union allies could be placed in ofﬁce. Ottumwa’s mayor as 
well as its streets and public improvements and public safety 
commissioners each received a salary that allowed them to hold 
ofﬁce without needing an additional source of income. This fact 
also potentially held promise for attracting a working person to 
run for ofﬁce. Yet almost as soon as Morrell workers launched 
themselves into city politics, middle-class groups mobilized to 
oppose their efforts. Beginning in early 1941, a middle class–
dominated Citizens Committee for the Council-Manager Plan 
proposed that Ottumwa adopt a city-manager plan of local gov-
ernment whereby a salaried city manager would be hired to “ad-
minister the city’s business.” The city council would then consist 
of unpaid elected ofﬁcials. Members of the Citizens Committee 
baldly stated that under the present conditions, namely greater 
labor union inﬂuence, “we cannot ELECT and KEEP men of ABILITY 
in ofﬁce.” The OIUC led the opposition to the plan, and argued 
that it was a blatant attempt to remove working people from par-
ticipating in local political affairs. Using language that echoed 
workers’ desire for power in workplace affairs, the opposition 
argued that the city-manager plan would mean “ONE-MAN 
AUTHORITY” and would deprive citizens of “political and personal 
liberty.” The opposition said that Ottumwa residents were being 
asked to “adopt the dictator plan and have a stranger rule us!” 
In the union’s ﬁrst true political success in city affairs, the city-
manager plan failed in March 1941 by a more than two-to-one 
vote in the city as a whole and by much wider margins in the 
working-class precincts. In 1944, however, after racketeering 
charges resulted in the dismissal of the city’s safety commissioner 
and nearly ended the mayor’s tenure, middle-class residents once 
again attempted to secure passage of the city-manager plan. The 
Fosters [owners of the Morrell plant] were open proponents of 
the plan this time around. Once again because of Local 1’s and the 
OIUC’s efforts, it fell to defeat by an almost two-to-one margin.11 
                                                 
11. Ottumwa Daily Courier, 3/7/1941, 3/11–12/1941, 3/17/1941, 3/19/1941, 
4/8/1944, 5/5/1944, 5/9/1944, 5/22/1944, 5/24/1944, 5/25/1944, and 6/21/ 
1944. 
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 Engaging themselves in local politics during the early 1940s, 
several leading militants from Local 1 also helped to establish 
and lead the state’s CIO council. The Iowa-Nebraska States In-
dustrial Union Council, CIO, established in Des Moines in April 
1938, held its fourth annual constitutional convention in Ottum-
wa in August 1941. Robert K. Gustafason from Local 1 served as 
one of the vice presidents. The following year, two members of 
Local 1 served on the council. Thomas B. Hadden, president of 
Local 1 in 1941, served as the secretary-treasurer alongside Pres-
ident Ben Henry, and Orvel Champ was one of the vice presidents. 
In addition, in 1942 Joseph Clark, a member of SWOC’s local at 
the Ottumwa Iron Works, was another vice president. In 1943, 
Orvel Champ, Local 1’s recording secretary that year, then be-
came the secretary-treasurer of the state council with James Pro-
venzano, a member of USWA Local 2134 of the Ottumwa Iron 
Works, a member of the executive board. Morrell-Ottumwa’s local 
constituted a strong presence in the founding and World War II 
years of the state CIO council since it was the second-largest CIO 
local in the state, behind only the UAW-organized John Deere 
plant in Waterloo. In 1943, after the Rath plant’s workforce in 
Waterloo joined the PWOC-CIO, Ottumwa’s Local 1 then consti-
tuted the third-largest union in the state council. Indeed, Local 1 
was instrumental in providing leaders for the Rath-Waterloo or-
ganizing campaign. Lester Bishop, Wilson (Moose) Rogers, and 
Edward Fitzpatrick all played signiﬁcant roles leading up to the 
union’s victory there in a November 1942 certiﬁcation election. A 
year earlier, Local 1 activists helped Ottumwa’s Dain, later John 
Deere, employees gain their ﬁrst union contract, and also helped 
establish the Cedar Rapids Industrial Union Council.12 
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 During the World War II years, Morrell-Ottumwa workers 
continued to run for local political ofﬁces. In March 1944, another 
president of Local 1, Edward A. Filliman, failed in the city’s school 
board elections. The following year, Filliman also lost by a huge 
margin to Frank Pedrick, a south side hardware merchant, in a 
race for city riverfront commissioner. In 1944, however, two union 
members won Wapello County’s two seats in the state legisla-
ture. Dean Aubrey, a UAW member and John Deere employee, 
and Wade McReynolds, a bus driver and AFL member, captured 
those seats in a heavy general election turnout. Voters seemed 
already to have perceived Filliman’s militant credentials as a po-
litical liability compared to Aubrey and McReynolds, who did 
not have the same reputation. As the fall election campaign 
approached, Ottumwa’s packing workers became involved in 
the newly formed CIO-PAC. Given the organizational and voter 
registration efforts of the OIUC, Ottumwa-Morrell workers were 
well prepared to lead local PAC efforts. Local 1 had already 
formed its own PAC in November 1943, consisting of nine mem-
bers including Donald Jones, Louis C. May, Virgil and Gene 
Bankson, and Dean Aubrey. Although the Iowa-Nebraska States 
Industrial Union Council did not make PAC a permanent part of 
its committee structure until 1946, the organization did place ten 
leading union members from across Iowa on its payroll to help 
with efforts to increase voter registration and distribute national 
PAC literature. Much of the CIO political action effort across Iowa 
in 1944 was focused on recruiting farmers into the Democratic 
party. Lyle Cooper, the UPWA international’s research director, 
speciﬁcally commended Ottumwa’s Local 1 in this regard as two 
farmers were elected as Democrats to formerly Republican-
dominated county ofﬁces. State CIO ofﬁcials noted that the Iowa 
legislature also passed a few laws beneﬁting labor for the ﬁrst 
time in twelve years, such as increased workmen’s compensation 
beneﬁts. Nevertheless, though the packing community’s Ward 
One gave Roosevelt 69 percent of its vote, up from 61 percent in 
                                                 
dore M. Covey to Lewis J. Clark, PWOC vice president, 5/26/1942, UPWA Rec-
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1940, across Ottumwa and Wapello County as a whole votes for 
the Democrats remained at the same levels as in 1940. Roosevelt 
received 58 percent from Ottumwa voters and 57 percent from 
voters in Wapello County.13 
 Nevertheless, at the local political level Democrats already 
dominated Wapello County’s politics by World War II. Except for 
the period between 1906 and 1912, when the majority of elected 
county ofﬁcials were Democrats, Wapello County’s elected of-
ﬁces had long been held by Republicans. Beginning in 1932, how-
ever, Democrats would prevail in Wapello County elected ofﬁces 
through the end of the 1960s. The only year in which Republicans 
came close to a majority in the county was in 1942, when there 
were six Democrats and ﬁve Republicans. This dominance would 
continue long after World War II. From 1956 to 1968, in fact, there 
were only a total of ﬁve Republicans elected for ninety positions 
in the county.14 
 Through all of its political and welfare efforts by the end of 
World War II, Local 1 had made signiﬁcant strides in creating 
loyalties to union and CIO political goals among a large segment 
of Ottumwa’s working-class residents. As the largest single or-
ganization in Ottumwa during the war years, Local 1 became 
enmeshed in the city’s welfare and wartime institutional support 
network. In 1943, Orvel Champ led the OIUC’s War Manpower 
Commission and Local 1 was the second-largest donor, behind 
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Morrell, to the National War Fund and Red Cross ﬁnancial cam-
paigns. Local 1 raised $12,000 in 1943, over 15 percent of Ottum-
wa’s entire goal. In 1944, Dean Aubrey served on the board of 
directors of Wapello County’s Red Cross. Local 1 and Morrell 
together accounted for more than 20 percent of the Red Cross’s 
quota for the county.15 
 At both the state and local level, however, the involvement of 
Local 1’s militants in political efforts often created more contro-
versy and turbulence than success. At the state level immediately 
following World War II, Local 1 militants were entrenched in po-
sitions of power on the Iowa-Nebraska States Industrial Union 
Council. In 1946, Orvel Champ was the group’s secretary, Donald 
Jones was the chair of the Legislative Committee, and Edward 
Filliman was secretary of the Resolutions Committee. With 
twenty-ﬁve votes in the council, the third largest bloc—behind 
Waterloo’s UPWA Local 46 from Rath and UAW Local 838 from 
John Deere—Local 1’s delegates supported the council’s establish-
ment of a permanent PAC. Yet Edward Filliman in particular was 
adamantly opposed to increasing the per-capita tax from four to 
ﬁve cents to help support PAC activities. Filliman had emerged as 
Local 1’s leading militant during World War II, and as the local’s 
chief steward from 1945 to 1948, had masterminded many of the 
local’s worker control efforts against Morrell’s speedup cam-
paigns. He attempted to assert the same sort of control over the 
state’s CIO council. Instrumental in leading the separation of the 
Iowa-Nebraska States Council into two separate councils in 1947, 
he accepted Orvel Champ’s nomination to be the ﬁrst president of 
the independent Iowa CIO council and won the election.16 
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 Filliman’s tenure as the state’s CIO council president was short 
and combative. His tenure also coincided with a period of intense 
factionalism within Iowa’s (and the national) CIO over various 
issues, particularly the Progressive party’s presidential campaign. 
Iowa’s CIO left-wingers, supportive of the Progressives, were led 
by Charles Hobbie, head of the United Farm Equipment and 
Metal Workers Union (FE). At the 1948 state CIO constitutional 
convention, Filliman promoted the majority report against third-
party candidates in the fall elections. Even though Hobbie had 
advocated support for third-party candidates, he nevertheless 
nominated Filliman for another term as state council president, 
noting that “I have worked with him over a period of time and 
found him to be efﬁcient, capable and [an] honest trade union 
leader.” But because of charges of opportunism leveled on him by 
state CIO president Ben Henry and his frustration with the pres-
ent council’s constitution that did not allow him to “take and for-
mulate and carry out policy,” Filliman declined the nomination.17 
 From 1946 through 1948, however, when Local 1’s militants 
were signiﬁcant leaders of the state CIO council, they strongly 
inﬂuenced the political efforts the group undertook in conjunc-
tion with the national CIO-PAC as well as the various regional 
representatives of CIO unions, such as UPWA, UAW, and FE. At 
the same time that the UPWA and FE were especially active po-
litically in Iowa following the disastrous 1946 elections and pas-
sage in June 1947 of the Taft-Hartley Act, the state CIO council 
urged greater PAC activities and greater effort in terms of farmer-
laborer cooperation. The state CIO council as well as UPWA, FE, 
and several other unions brought their members out in droves to 
protest a proposed “right-to-work” law for Iowa. On April 21, 
1947, 25,000 unionists picketed at the state capitol in Des Moines 
to no avail; the law passed Iowa’s rural-dominated legislature 
and Republican governor Robert Blue signed it into law.18 
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 Passage of a state “right-to-work” law galvanized both the 
UPWA and FE into pursuing farmer-labor organizing. Union 
leaders felt farmers needed to be more sympathetic to the needs 
of labor and see their common interests. Both unions established 
full-time farm relations directors in 1946, and began to pursue 
cooperative efforts with the Iowa Farmers Union (IFU) by the end 
of that year. The IFU’s president beginning in 1945 was Fred W. 
Stover, a social democrat and devotee of Henry A. Wallace. As 
was true of many left-liberals and their organizations during the 
1940s, Stover and the IFU pushed issues such as full employment, 
economic planning, expanded social welfare and civil rights pro-
grams, higher farm commodity subsidies, and international co-
operation with the Soviet Union. Stover’s ﬁrst editorial for the 
Iowa Union Farmer called for closer relations with labor since “[a] 
sympathetic understanding by farmers of labor and labor organ-
izations is of prime importance if we are to progress as citizens 
in a democracy.” The fact that the IFU was as committed to social 
democratic programs as either the UPWA or FE greatly helped 
labor’s coalition-building efforts with farmers.19 
 To be sure, the social democracy of the UPWA, FE, and IFU 
in this period was episodic and, as David Plotke carefully points 
out about this theme in American liberalism in the 1930s and 
1940s, should not be seen as “an autonomous political force” and 
“had no chance of success” in replacing the Democratic party. 
Moreover, Ottumwa’s workers, as they demonstrated in the 1948 
national elections, were not budding social democrats, even if 
they wanted greater shop ﬂoor power. Nevertheless, the social 
democratic themes and programs of the three organizations cap-
tured the imaginations and support, however ﬂeeting, perhaps, 
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of many workers in Ottumwa and industrial cities in Iowa and 
the Midwest in the period. The UPWA’s social democratic pro-
grams rested on a vision of labor, capital, and the state cooperat-
ing to restructure America’s economy and society so that class 
conﬂict would be reduced and all Americans would prosper. The 
UPWA advocated national economic planning or “planned pro-
duction for abundance,” practiced already in Austin, Minnesota, 
where union members at the Hormel packing plant had won a 
guaranteed annual wage. The UPWA also supported pay raises, 
especially those advanced in the union’s national strikes of 1946 
and 1948, social welfare, farmer-labor cooperation, civil rights 
and antidiscrimination programs, and local union participation 
in Democratic community politics.20 
 Ottumwa’s Local 1 quickly became one of Iowa’s most active 
UPWA social democratic advocates, especially in regard to 
farmer-labor organizing. In April 1947, Lee Simon, the UPWA’s 
farm relations director, served as a conciliator along with Local 1 
representatives for a four-day Ottumwa milk strike, in which 190 
dairy farmers refused to accept the price cut imposed by four 
area milk distributors. Building on the success of Simon’s efforts, 
Stover, Simon, and the Reverend John Harley Telfer, pastor of 
the First Congregationalist Church in Ottumwa, elaborated in 
May on the IFU district conference theme, “Building for Peace and 
Abundance,” by speaking to Ottumwans on “Farmer-Labor Team- 
work for Peace and Abundance.” Telfer, an Ottumwa resident 
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since July 1945, had already made a name for himself as an out-
spoken advocate for black civil rights. Educated at the University 
of Chicago, he had been director of the Milwaukee Federation 
Forum and Milwaukee Town Hall before moving to Ottumwa. 
He chaired Ottumwa’s Interracial Committee and the People’s 
Flood Prevention Committee, an organization of local farmers 
and laborers. Beginning in 1947, he became the UPWA District 3’s 
radio show host. The show aired three times weekly and was de-
scribed by the UPWA as one of the most widely aired labor radio 
shows in the country.21 
 Soon after the IFU conference, Local 1 formed one of the ﬁrst 
UPWA local union farmer-labor committees. Later in the fall, Ot-
tumwa was the site of the UPWA-IFU jointly sponsored Farmer–
Labor Day picnic. More than 3,000 people attended the two-day 
celebration at Wildwood Park on Ottumwa’s south side and 
heard liberal and left-wing farm and labor leaders urge a “po-
litical revolt against [R]epublican legislators and congressmen.” 
The picnic was organized by Ed Filliman and Dwight Anderson, 
a farmer from Agency and local IFU leader, along with a plan-
ning committee including ﬁve meatpacking workers, ﬁve em-
ployees of the Deere-owned Dain Company farm implement 
plant, two employees of the Ottumwa Iron Works, and one ma-
chine operator at the Hardscog Pneumatic Tool Works in Ottum-
wa. Local 1 militants later complained about how AFL groups 
were notably absent from this and other farm-labor efforts in 
Ottumwa during the period, but it is difﬁcult to know just how 
eager they actually were to work with them, given earlier squab-
bles between the two groups. The FE also held joint meetings 
with the IFU during summer and fall 1947 at Charles City, home 
to a large Oliver farm implement plant, and other nearby north-
central Iowa locations.22 
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 Although the state CIO council was strongly supportive of 
farm-labor cooperation and political efforts, inviting Fred Stover, 
Homer Ayres, and Lee Simon to speak on the issue at its 1946 
and 1947 constitutional conventions, the state CIO, like the na-
tional CIO, was not supportive of third-party candidacies in the 
1948 election. Thus, a more decidedly left-wing political impact 
from the joint efforts of the UPWA, FE, and IFU was limited. This 
is especially evident in the failure of Henry A. Wallace’s presi-
dential bid in 1948. Wallace’s emphasis on programs for full em-
ployment, economic abundance, and international cooperation 
with the Soviet Union were attractive for many left-wingers with 
social democratic concerns. In late 1947 and early 1948, the FE 
international and Iowa’s FE District 5’s leadership endorsed Wal-
lace. Some local leaders within the UPWA also lobbied on his 
behalf. Fred Stover bucked the National Farmers Union to en-
dorse Wallace in the January 1948 issue of the Iowa Union Farmer. 
Yet in 1948, most Americans associated these planks with com-
munism. Accordingly, such efforts were unacceptable to most 
farmers and laborers. Also crucial in swaying CIO members was 
the removal of several FE District 5 left-wingers by the state CIO 
council in August. CIO regional director Ben Henry castigated 
Hobbie and Stover for their support of Wallace. Despite the sup-
port and organizing efforts of the IFU, FE, and some UPWA locals 
on behalf of Wallace’s presidential candidacy, he did not gain 
many votes in the November election. He only garnered 1 per-
cent more of the total votes in north-central Iowa counties where 
the IFU had its largest support than his overall nationwide vote 
total of 2 percent. He did even worse in Ottumwa, where he re-
ceived less than 2 percent of the votes cast, primarily because 
Local 1 leaders, such as Edward Filliman, did not encourage their 
membership to support him.23 
                                                 
23. Proceedings, Eighth Annual Constitutional Convention of Iowa-Nebraska 
States Industrial Council, CIO, 1946, p. 189, IFL, SHSI; Proceedings, Ninth An-
nual Constitutional Convention, Iowa-Nebraska Industrial Union Council, 1947, 
pp. 302–9, IFL, SHSI; FE News, December 1947; Iowa Union Farmer, 1/17/1948 
and 10/16/1948; Des Moines Register, 11/7/1948; and Ben Henry to Fred Stover, 
10/30/1948, box 1, Stover Records. On the struggle over Wallace’s candidacy 
within the UPWA international union, see Horowitz, “Negro and White, Unite 
and Fight!” 198–201. On the Farmers Union and the Wallace campaign, see 
William C. Pratt, “The Farmers Union and the 1948 Henry Wallace Campaign,” 
Unionism and Iowa’s Politics      91 
 After 1948 left-liberal farm-labor educational efforts declined 
noticeably. This was owing in part to conﬂicts within the IFU, to 
conﬂicts between them and the state CIO, and to the virtual ab-
sence of support for the popular front in Iowa as a whole. An-
other signiﬁcant factor was the loosening of ties between the IFU 
and the UPWA. Even though UPWA District 3 leadership con-
tinued to pass resolutions supporting farm-labor work, they no 
longer organized farm-labor meetings and conferences. Some of 
this might be attributed to Lee Simon’s death in September 1948. 
From 1948 to 1950, the UPWA devoted most of its efforts to pro-
moting farm-labor cooperation by distributing leaﬂets at its booths 
at county fairs in the Midwest. These efforts were substantial in 
their own way. In the fall of 1948, for example, UPWA District 3 
staffed booths at twelve county fairs in Iowa and at least two 4-H 
shows, and during the summer of 1949 it increased its allocations 
for exhibits and literature and even sponsored a group of ballad 
singers at over thirty local union meetings and county fairs in 
Iowa and Nebraska. In all, the UPWA visited more than forty fairs 
in 1949 and expanded its monthly literature mailings to farmers 
from 14,000 to 100,000 pieces between 1948 and 1949. Yet in 1949 
the UPWA no longer was as active in sponsoring farm-labor meet-
ings and conferences, unlike the FE, which merged reluctantly 
with another outcast CIO international, the United Electrical, 
Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE). Local 1’s farm-
labor committee also evaporated during these years. Conse-
quently, after 1948 the FE was the only labor union willing to 
work in this way with the IFU.24 
 Criticism within the state CIO council during the early 1950s 
singled out several problems with mainstream CIO farmer-labor 
cooperative and political efforts. In 1951, Jacob “Jake” Mincks, a 
member of UAW Local 74 representing Ottumwa’s John Deere 
plant, voiced several concerns as chair of the state CIO council’s 
farm-labor committee about the episodic nature of labor’s political 
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efforts. Mincks, though never employed at Morrell-Ottumwa or 
a participant in the factionalism within Local 1, emerged as the 
most important unionist from Deere in Ottumwa after starting 
work there in 1947. He immediately became involved in local 
union, community, and statewide political causes. Raised on a 
farm south of Ottumwa, he came to live in the city in 1931 after 
his father’s death. After working at odd jobs and for the Civilian 
Conservation Corps, he ﬁrst joined a labor union in 1938 as a 
Teamster, and then worked at the Ottumwa Iron Works from 
1941 to 1947 and joined the local CIO steelworkers union there. 
Though like the militants who formed Local 1 Mincks was an 
early CIO supporter, unlike them he apparently never supported 
militant job actions. He revealed in a later interview that he took 
pride that Deere had only one signiﬁcant strike (in 1950) during 
the long period that he worked there. Although clearly ambitious 
in his own way, he did not view politics as a forum for punishing 
employers. Within a year of joining the Deere ranks, Mincks was 
a clear leader within the UAW local there. He was also one of the 
UAW’s local representatives on the OIUC. In October 1948, he 
gave a report to the local’s membership on PAC efforts, and one 
month later initiated a motion within the local to have them go 
on record supporting Ben Henry’s purge of the left-wingers 
within the state’s FE. His political involvement at the local level 
soon carried him into prominence within the state CIO council. 
He became a consistent voice for more concerted political efforts 
on the part of the state CIO council. Indeed, Jack McCoy, part of 
the new generation of Local 1 leaders to move into state-level 
politics, later described Mincks as “the pusher behind the political 
activities of all of us [in Ottumwa].”25 
 Mincks thoroughly backed the new leadership of the state CIO 
council, led since the controversial 1948 elections by president 
Vernon Dale and secretary-treasurer Kenneth Everhart. Dale, a 
member of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) 
Local 261 in Muscatine, and Everhart, part of UAW Local 838 in 
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Waterloo, were committed especially, like Mincks, to increasing 
the level of funding for the state CIO council’s PAC efforts. This 
commitment never wavered from the late 1940s through the state 
council’s merger with the state AFL council in 1956 largely because 
both Dale and Everhart were reelected to their ofﬁces each year 
by acclamation. In 1950 this fact led to an attempt initiated by 
Filliman to oust them by demanding a secret ballot for the election 
of ofﬁcers. Three years earlier, Filliman, along with many other 
delegates from the UPWA especially, had demanded roll call votes 
for the election of ofﬁcers so that local union constituencies could 
be assured that delegates voted for the candidates they had 
agreed on before the convention. That motion was narrowly de-
feated, and so was Filliman’s attempt to enforce the secret ballot 
provision in 1950. Nevertheless, the defeat of this motion caused 
several local unions, including Local 1, to withdraw from the 
state CIO council for the next two years. Although Filliman’s overt 
argument all along was the need for democratic process and 
responsiveness, his efforts also strongly suggested a personal 
desire for power and control. After the return of most local union 
delegations to the state’s fold by 1953, state CIO delegates no 
longer were swayed by Filliman or other CIO militants. The two-
year absence of the most militant voices effectively muted their 
voice in the state CIO council.26 
 As articulated by Dale, Everhart, and Mincks, the PAC chair 
beginning in 1952, effective political efforts demanded more sys-
tematic voter registration, more lobbying efforts, especially at the 
grassroots level, and, more than anything, a greater commitment 
by local union members to ﬁnancially support PAC. By 1950, for 
instance, the national CIO-PAC was working more closely with 
the state CIO council’s PAC, and had committed substantial 
funding for selected campaigns, especially Albert Loveland’s 
candidacy for the U.S. Senate. Morrell-Ottumwa’s Local 1 spent 
$3,000 of its own funds and expended considerable manpower 
in canvassing unsuccessfully for Loveland on behalf of PAC. The 
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CIO hoped Loveland would also appeal to family farmers because 
of his support for the Brannan Plan, a proposal to hike farm sup-
ports to higher, ﬁxed levels. Despite winning 67 percent of the 
First Ward’s vote as well as 54 percent of Ottumwa’s and 53 per-
cent of Wapello County’s votes, Loveland only mustered 45 per-
cent of the state’s total tally. Some blamed his poor showing on 
scathing attacks on the Brannan Plan by the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, a larger organization representing more pros-
perous individual farmers and agribusiness interests. More im-
portant, because of a lack of more consistent political efforts and 
money overall, Democratic candidates did not do well through-
out the state. This sentiment was voiced by Mincks when he 
noted in his farmer-labor committee report regarding U.S. House 
efforts, “We down in Ottumwa can carry Wapello County, but 
we have four counties in the district down there. How are you 
going to carry the others?” Another CIO delegate noted that too 
few county-level PAC committees had been established. In his 
1952 president’s report, Dale noted that “in the early days . . . too 
few people tried to do too much. The end result [was] a lot of 
noise with little accomplished.” On a related issue of farmer-
labor political strategies, Everhart noted in 1952 that “setting up 
booths at State Fairs [was not] particularly conducive to good 
farmer-labor relations in the state of Iowa.” Though thoroughly 
supportive of farmer-labor political efforts, he questioned the 
tactic of “trying to cram a farm program down the farmer’s [sic] 
of Iowa without knowing what we are talking about.” In another 
debate on political tactics, Everhart and Mincks stressed the need 
for more direct visits with local legislators.27 
                                                 
27. Proceedings, Thirteenth Convention, 1951, pp. 2–6, 119–23, 175–76; Proceed-
ings, Fourteenth Convention, 1952, pp. 6–12, 70–76, 149–56. On Local 1’s support 
for Loveland, see Edward Filliman, UPWA field representative, Weekly Report, 
11/4/1950, folder 13, box 415, UPWA Records, SHSW; Morrell-Ottumwa work-
ers’ efforts on behalf of the PAC in 1950 for Loveland’s campaign were most sim-
ilar to those of Rockford, Illinois, Industrial Union Council’s efforts as described 
by Fay Calkins in The CIO and the Democratic Party (Chicago, 1952), 86–111. 
Although unsuccessful, the OIUC was the inside force in Wapello County’s 
Democratic party’s support for Loveland in 1950. Robert Zieger’s analysis of 
PAC’s ability to more successfully generate large amounts of money for liberal 
candidates rather than mobilizing union voters and influencing party leaders 
was true of the Loveland campaign on the state level but not in Ottumwa. See 
Zieger, The CIO, 306–12. On the Branna Plan, see Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. 
Unionism and Iowa’s Politics      95 
 Again, the underlying need, according to these leaders, was 
greater funding for the PAC. Before the 1951 state CIO council con-
vention, the militants, led by Filliman, had effectively blocked 
increases in the per-capita tax. However, without the militants’ 
attendance at either the 1951 or 1952 conventions, Dale and Ever-
hart were able to make the issue a key point of debate. At the 
1951 convention, President Dale noted that he was sympathetic 
to the packinghouse workers’ delegates’ position against a per-
capita tax increase, but he stressed that the need for a two-cent 
increase (from ﬁve to seven cents) was pressing. The two-cent in-
crease would be earmarked for PAC’s use only. This issue was 
ﬁnally resolved the following year. The 1952 convention passed 
the two-cent per capita increase after a lengthy debate regarding 
the reafﬁliation of the locals that owed back dues or had walked 
out over the per-capita issue in 1950. Initially, the Resolutions 
Committee passed a resolution demanding full repayment be-
fore locals were allowed back onto the state CIO council. But Fort 
Dodge UPWA Local 31 member and UPWA Region 3 director 
Russell Bull, who had helped to move Local 1 militants out of 
power during the 1950–1952 period, condemned the resolution 
for trying to “ring [sic] every last cent of blood” out of locals be-
fore letting them back in. Both Dale and Everhart reminded dele-
gates that there was no sense in punishing delinquent locals since 
the PAC program needed all locals to be present and current in 
dues for it to function effectively. Everhart clinched support for a 
more moderate resolution that would give the executive board 
discretionary power over conditional readmittance by exclaiming 
that “you make councils out of people, not out of money.” Ben 
Henry made an indirect reference to Local 1 in regard to the local 
union readmittance and the PAC issue by noting that “one par-
ticular local union is in an important spot in this political action 
program that we are going to try to promote.”28 
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 From 1948 to 1952, Local 1’s militants also made several efforts 
to assert their power in community politics. But just as occurred 
within the state CIO council, these efforts all faltered. In their wake, 
moderate and more conciliatory Local 1 leaders emerged and ex-
perienced greater political success. Particularly in the aftermath 
of the tumultuous 1948 UPWA meatpacking strike, Local 1 mili-
tants focused even more attention on controlling city politics. 
They viewed the 1949 city council elections as crucial to the lo-
cal’s political power in Ottumwa in several respects. On the most 
basic level, Local 1 hoped to retake the offensive against the city’s 
middle-class community that had largely been unsupportive of 
its strike efforts. True to their tactics at the shop ﬂoor level, Local 
1’s militants wanted to mobilize union members and other blue-
collar Ottumwans to defeat and punish public ofﬁcials who had 
hindered the workers’ strike efforts. As a consequence, militants 
even attempted to dissuade workers from supporting friends of 
labor, in this particular election, Herschel Loveless, because he 
and others were seen as not sufﬁciently militant. Loveless’s vic-
tory would be another sign of the weakening hold the militants 
had in Local 1. 
 Early in 1949, Local 1, the OIUC, and the TLA formed the 
Ottumwa Policy Committee to focus working-class votes in the up-
coming city elections. During the mid-March primaries, the 
Ottumwa Policy Committee supported David Nevin, Lester Par-
cell, and Patrick Harden. Each man won enough votes to be en-
tered in the general election. Mayoral candidate Nevin and safety 
commissioner candidate Parcell both ﬁnished a close second. 
Mayor Herman Schaefer was thoroughly defeated, having won 
the scorn of not only working-class voters for his role in the 1948 
strike, but also having alienated middle-class voters for not hav-
ing controlled the situation more effectively. Streets commission 
candidate Patrick Harden won the primary election for this po- 
sition. Local 1 then embarked on an intensive propaganda cam-
paign during the two weeks preceding the general election.29 
 Local 1 supported Nevin over the other mayoral candidate, 
Herschel Loveless, because union leaders claimed that Loveless 
had not joined a union until he needed labor’s political support. 
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Born on a farm near Fremont, Iowa, in 1911, Loveless had moved 
to Ottumwa as a youngster and graduated from Ottumwa High 
School in 1927. He then worked for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. 
Paul and Paciﬁc Railroad through most of the Great Depression. 
In 1939, he joined Morrell’s workforce as a turbine operator in 
the power plant before returning to work for the Milwaukee Rail-
road in 1944. On a leave of absence from the railroad, Loveless 
organized the street and sanitation departments and then served 
as the city council’s emergency chief organizer during the disas-
trous 1947 ﬂood in Ottumwa. It was in this capacity that he 
earned widespread support among Ottumwans. Nevertheless, 
Local 1 accused Loveless of not joining the Railway Clerk’s Union 
until the mid-1940s when he pursued political ambitions.30 
 Local 1 also tried to sway working-class Ottumwans to look 
unfavorably on Edna Lawrence, Lester Parcell’s opponent for 
safety commissioner in the city election. Lawrence, like Loveless, 
had considerable support among workers in the city. In 1948, 
with Local 1 support, she had won a seat in the state legislature 
but then resigned her ofﬁce in early 1949 in hopes of winning city 
ofﬁce. Local 1 noted that Lawrence had run unsuccessfully for 
local ofﬁce many times before and now seemed more concerned 
about settling old scores than serving Ottumwans on the state 
level, as she had been entrusted to do. John Meagher, Harden’s 
opponent for streets commissioner, had served in that position 
during the 1948 strike and had suffered consequently in the pri-
mary election. Although his role in the strike had been minor, 
Local 1 did not spare him, attesting that “his management of 
ofﬁce and regard for the public [since 1947] has been very poor.” 
Indeed, the local reminded workers of Meagher’s positions as well, 
labeling him a “scab” for having crossed the picket line during 
Ottumwa’s 1922 railroad strike.31 
 Before the general election, Local 1 reminded the packing 
community and other blue-collar residents to “recall just what 
position certain members of the City Council took in regards to 
the strike action at Morrells last year.” Yet, just before the election, 
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the Ottumwa Policy Committee alliance of AFL and CIO unions 
broke down. It is not clear which side initiated the split, but Local 
1 was left alone in support of its candidates. It seems fair to spec-
ulate, however, that many Ottumwa voters, even among the 
city’s working class, saw Local 1’s decision to stick with its can-
didates as evidence of its combativeness. Most of the other AFL 
and CIO unions in town supported Loveless over Nevin because 
of Loveless’s help for working-class neighborhoods damaged by 
the 1947 ﬂood. Lawrence, according to other unions in town, 
boasted signiﬁcant prolabor credentials. The other unions sup-
ported Loveless, Lawrence, and Meagher. When the votes were 
counted, only Harden among the Local 1 endorsed candidates 
emerged victorious. Demonstrating the growing divisions 
within Local 1, the voting results in different parts of the city sug-
gest that many of Morrell’s rank and ﬁle ignored their leaders’ 
endorsements. The east end original packinghouse community 
supported Nevin for mayor while south side residents, where 
most of the ﬂood damage occurred, solidly cast their votes for 
Loveless. Thus, despite a tremendous effort on the part of the 
militant leadership of Local 1 to reafﬁrm its power, the largest 
city election turnout in Ottumwa’s history underscored the un-
raveling of this control and of unity within the local’s ranks.32 
 After 1949, Local 1’s militant leaders had little ability to con-
vince blue-collar residents to support their candidates in local 
elections. Allegations of sloppy handling of local union funds 
also bothered voters. Ed Filliman, a UPWA international ﬁeld 
representative after 1949, exacerbated tensions within the local 
by noting that the ﬁnancial stability of Local 1 in 1950–1951 had 
been seriously compromised by its ofﬁcers’ predilection for ever-
increasing salaries and misappropriations of local union funds. 
Too many ofﬁcers, Filliman noted, were “Do-Nothing, Money-
Grabbing individuals.” Although it is difﬁcult to know how 
much Filliman’s charges were motivated by his sense of declin-
ing power, having lost a position in not only Local 1 but also on 
the state CIO council, he named the local’s president in these 
years, Walter Van Tassel, as a particular culprit. In February 1951, 
Local 1’s trustees, including Donald Jones, seconded Filliman’s 
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accusations by ﬁling charges against Van Tassel for drawing pay 
for lost time at the same time that Morrell paid him for vacation 
time. To a large degree the ﬁght within Local 1 during these years 
reﬂected a power struggle between the older militants and the 
newer generation of less combative union leaders.33 
 This power struggle created generally poor results for Local 
1 in city elections during the early 1950s. In 1951, Van Tassel and 
Thomas Cohagan, Local 1’s recording secretary in 1951 and a 
prominent member of the new generation of union leaders at 
Morrell-Ottumwa, ran for city ofﬁces and lost. Each candidate 
not only failed to win but could not gain the support of voters in 
the packinghouse workers’ precincts. Herschel Loveless, how-
ever, again won the city’s mayoral election soundly with the 
OIUC’s solid support. Two years later, Herschel Loveless was the 
only one of ﬁve OIUC-endorsed candidates in the 1953 election 
who won versus those endorsed by the middle-class and profes-
sional voter–backed “Good Government Association.” Van Tas-
sel and Dean Aubrey both lost.34 
 By 1953, internal factionalism within Local 1 had seriously 
compromised its ability to effectively run its own members or 
even gain working-class support for its endorsed candidates in 
city elections. The deleterious impact of this factionalism was 
starkly illustrated in that year when the “Good Government As-
sociation” revived its campaign to implement a council-manager 
plan of city government. Unlike the case in 1941 and 1944 when 
Local 1 had stood at the center of opposition to similar plans, in 
1953 the local ignored the campaign until after enough petitions 
were collected by July to put it on the general election ballot. At 
Local 1’s July 21 membership meeting, the rank and ﬁle decided 
to spend between $300 and $500 to ﬁght its passage in a last-ditch 
effort. On July 26, the council-manager plan passed with 58 per-
cent of voters supporting it. Although voters in the old First 
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Ward immediate packinghouse neighborhood rejected it by a 68 
percent majority, packing workers who lived in the city’s south 
side precincts contributed to its victory.35 
 Although factionalism within Local 1 contributed to the 
losses in community politics in 1953, Ottumwa mayor Herschel 
Loveless demonstrated his strong commitment to labor in the 
battle over the council-manager plan in that year. Jack McCoy, 
an employee of Morrell since 1949 and recording secretary for 
Local 1 in 1953, noted explicitly how Local 1 and the OIUC counted 
on Loveless’s support:  
When the ﬁght over going to a city manager form of government 
developed, Herschel Loveless came down and visited with Dave 
Hart and I [sic]. He didn’t want to turn over the city government to 
the Chamber of Commerce crowd. We said we’d do our job at the 
plant. The damn election was held on a Saturday, and we assigned 
our stewards to different precincts. They worked hard to try to stop 
it. The newspaper had been building that up for a long while, and 
they beat us on it, in spite of the stewards doing a good job. We 
must have ﬁelded between sixty and eighty stewards that Saturday 
in the precincts in Ottumwa.36 
 
Transforming Iowa’s Politics 
Although factional conﬂict within Local 1 diluted the union’s po-
litical strength in Ottumwa during the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the union mobilized sufﬁcient power to transform state politics. 
By 1953, a new generation of Local 1 leaders, like Jack McCoy 
and Dave Hart, working closely with Jake Mincks, emerged and 
began to contribute to the next and more successful stage in this 
political transformation. In 1952, Mincks became Wapello County 
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Democratic chair and, in 1954, McCoy was selected as one of Lo- 
cal 1’s representatives on the OIUC. That fall, along with Ottumwa 
AFL unionist Wade McReynolds and after borrowing over $1,000 
from the OIUC’s building fund to ﬁnance his campaign, McCoy 
was then elected to the Iowa House of Representatives, a position 
he won again in 1956. Beginning in the mid-1950s, with the suc-
cessful merger of the AFL and CIO at both the local level in Ot-
tumwa and, more important, at the state level, Ottumwa’s union 
leaders contributed centrally to the Democratic party’s successes.37 
 The state CIO council’s 1953 constitutional convention, ﬁt-
tingly held in Ottumwa, opened after an address by Mayor Her-
schel Loveless with Iowa CIO president Vernon Dale recognizing 
Ottumwa’s key role in the state’s labor movement. Dale noted 
that “much of the leadership and a great number of the member-
ship of the early days of our organization [came from the city]. 
Ottumwa and its labor movement contributed much to the 
growth of the CIO in our state.” Dale immediately went on to 
highlight how he viewed the state CIO council’s political action 
efforts, activities in which Ottumwans Mincks, McCoy, and Hart 
would all play important roles. Mincks, as he had been since the 
year before, was chair of the PAC, McCoy was secretary of the cre-
dentials committee, and Hart, another prominent member of the 
new generation of leaders at Local 1, was secretary of the Rules 
Committee. Born in 1907 in the coal camp town of Hocking, 
Iowa, just west of Ottumwa, Hart had attended UMWA meet-
ings with his father during the World War I era. He worked at 
odd jobs in Iowa and Chicago before the 1930s, when he moved 
to New York City. There, interrupted by military service during 
World War II, he held a variety of laboring positions. When his 
father died in 1947, Hart returned to Ottumwa and got a job at 
Morrell just after the 1948 strike. Quickly selected as a depart-
ment steward, he became chief steward in 1952 in the wake of 
Local 1’s receivership and most intense period of factionalism.38 
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 In his comments on the legislative committee’s reports at the 
1953 convention, President Dale identiﬁed labor’s most crucial 
political objectives. Labor unionists elected to the Iowa legislature, 
such as Kenneth Everhart and Jack McCoy, hammered away at 
fellow politicians about the need for passing new unemployment 
and workmen’s compensation legislation and repealing the 
state’s right-to-work law, the so-called Senate File 109. However, 
everything, according to Dale, hinged on counterbalancing the 
control that the Republican party, and its key lobbying group, the 
Iowa Manufacturers Association (IMA), had in the legislature. 
The way to neutralize this Republican dominance was through 
reapportionment. Although Iowa’s constitution required reap- 
portionment after each census, no legislative reapportionment 
had occurred since 1886. According to political scientist Charles 
Wiggins, two state constitutional amendments passed in 1904 
and 1928 made reapportionment “virtually impossible.” The 
result, especially in the state house since each county received 
equal representation, was that urban counties were vastly under- 
represented. Dale proclaimed that reapportionment “is the only 
way that the people in Des Moines, Waterloo, Cedar Rapids, 
Davenport, Dubuque, Sioux City, and the various other cities of 
the state can have themselves represented.” In his 1952 opening 
convention remarks Dale had also stressed the problem of dis-
proportionate representation in the state legislature. There were 
too many “men from smaller community areas, farmers and peo-
ple dependent upon the farm for their living [as well as] those 
directly representative of the antilabor groups, the big business 
boys and their lawyers” who constituted the legislators’ mem-
bership. PAC chair Mincks emphasized how all the convention’s 
resolutions tied into the need to get “our people into the politi- 
cal parties in this state of ours” and to raise funds for PAC. On 
the funds, Dale noted that the passage of the two-cent increase in 
the per capita tax, the so-called citizenship fund, had resulted in 
much “improved ﬁnancial condition and ability to carry out 
needed projects in political action and legislation.”39 
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 Reporting on the CIO’s political efforts over the next two 
years, Dale noted incremental gains. Although the structure of 
the PAC program was revamped in 1954 with new full-time rep-
resentatives appointed and training classes started, Dale ex-
claimed that “you should be getting damn well fed-up with the 
spectacle of a labor committee [in the state legislature] headed by 
a business man [sic] and overloaded by farmers who admittedly 
do not understand the labor problem.” Although Democrats 
picked up eighteen seats in the House, and Republican governor 
Leo Hoegh agreed to some favorable appointments to various 
commissioner positions and made good on promises to provide 
increases in unemployment and workmen’s compensation, labor 
otherwise “received little or nothing” from the state legislature. 
Moreover, by 1955 much of the state CIO council’s discussion 
pertained to the more immediate issue of the imminent merger 
of the AFL and CIO.40 
 To be sure, many veteran Iowa CIO unionists looked skepti-
cally at the merger of the two unions. Many agreed with Ralph 
Helstein, UPWA president, that the merger was defensive; it was 
a strategy of effectively combating the strength of growing cor-
porations during a period of national political conservatism 
while also conserving early gains. At the last state CIO council 
convention, held in Des Moines on June 26, 1956, much of the 
convention’s debate was devoted to the upcoming merger con-
vention, held the following two days in Des Moines. Mincks was 
one of the outspoken voices urging acceptance and the necessity 
of the merger. Indeed, Mincks was the guiding force between Ot-
tumwa’s CIO and AFL councils’ merger, delayed at the request 
of the AFL council until after the state’s merger. To allay the fears 
of the smaller AFL central body that its unions would have no 
voice in the new city labor council, Mincks negotiated a nearly 
equally partitioned representative council. Ottumwa was in the 
nearly unique position of having CIO unions outnumber AFL 
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unions. The only other Iowa city where this was true was Water-
loo, where a volunteer coordinating council had been active since 
1950. When founded in August 1956, Ottumwa’s AFL-CIO labor 
council had four AFL representatives and ﬁve CIO representatives, 
even though Local 1 and UAW Local 74 together accounted for 
75 percent of the city’s total labor union membership.41 
 In large part, the merger between the AFL and CIO in Iowa 
occurred as smoothly as it did because the top CIO council 
ofﬁcials, like Dale, Everhart, and Mincks, were not militants but 
were moderates interested in practical political gains for laboring 
people. They saw the necessity of the merger primarily for polit-
ical action purposes. Important, too, was the decision of the 
state’s top AFL ofﬁcials, most notably Ray Mills, the new AFL-
CIO president, to throw their support to the Democratic party. 
Mills, a lifelong Republican, publicly announced his switch to the 
Democratic party in 1955 after tiring of the IMA-dominated Re-
publican positions on labor laws in the state. Republican gover-
nor Leo Hoegh had promised in his 1954 campaign to support 
the union shop, for instance, but was unable to sway the con-
servative forces in the legislature to overturn the state’s right-to-
work law. By combining forces, AFL and CIO activists could cer-
tainly accomplish much more working together in the Iowa legis-
lature than they could separately. Iowa’s AFL-CIO merger in 1956 
created a more politically uniﬁed labor movement at both the 
state and local levels. At the founding convention, the CIO was 
now outnumbered by AFL unions in the Iowa Federation of Labor 
(IFL), AFL-CIO, by 390 to 587 votes. Yet in several respects, the 
CIO still wielded considerable weight. For instance, both the 
UPWA and UAW received their own vice presidents because each 
had more than 10,000 members. UPWA Locals 46 and 1 as well 
as UAW Local 838 were the largest locals in the new IFL. By the 
1957 IFL convention, Mincks, Hart, and McCoy all held promi-
nent positions in the state labor federation. Mincks was the Cre-
dentials Committee chair, Hart was Resolutions Committee chair, 
and McCoy was the new Committee on Political Education 
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(COPE) director. After the death of Russell Bull in 1959, Hart be-
came director of UPWA District 3.42 
 In terms of approaches to political action, the IFL’s basic strat-
egy, as well as leading personnel, remained true to the CIO’s 
original plan of attack. Farmer-labor cooperation, for instance, re-
mained a key component of the IFL’s approach to political mobi-
lization. IFL leaders worked closely with a new farm group, the 
National Farmers Organization (NFO), for joint political beneﬁt. 
Although its organizing strategies differed, for many farmers the 
NFO ﬁlled a void left by the decline of the Iowa Farmers Union, 
embroiled in communist accusations throughout the 1950s. 
Formed in 1955 and led by Oren Lee Stanley beginning in De-
cember 1956, the NFO focused its strategy for raising farm prices 
on aggressive organizing and collective bargaining. The NFO 
gained members who were disillusioned with the strategies of 
farm cooperatives and who felt leery about the future of the fed-
eral farm program. Adopted at its convention of 1958, the NFO’s 
collective bargaining aimed at obtaining master contracts with 
livestock processors and farm commodity buyers on a “cost- 
plus” basis. Speciﬁcally, according to NFO historian Jon Lauck, 
the “NFO’s plan involved Marketing Area Bargaining Commit-
tees, elected by NFO members, presenting offers to meatpackers 
and promising a steady ﬂow of livestock, all in exchange for con-
tracts for better prices.” After signing up over 100,000 members, 
the NFO began to stage holding actions in 1959 as a ﬁrst step 
toward gaining master contracts. One of the ﬁrst holding actions 
took place at St. Joseph, Missouri, for an entire week. Packers 
there were able to break the effort, however, by trucking in live-
stock from outside the organized area. More successful holding 
actions took place in April 1961 in the Omaha, Kansas City, and 
St. Joseph areas, followed by further efforts in these and other 
areas in 1962–1964.43 
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 At the local level, this new form of farm-labor cooperation 
was most successful in Waterloo after the formation of the Black 
Hawk Labor Council (BHLC), AFL-CIO, in 1956. Besides Ottum-
wa, Waterloo was the state’s other strong CIO center where the 
merger with the AFL went smoothly because of several previous 
years of cooperation between the two unions. Unlike earlier 
efforts by the UPWA and the FE in the late 1940s, however, the 
BHLC’s farmer-labor efforts resulted in greater political gains in 
this period because they were not tainted with left-wing activities. 
The NFO initially approached the BHLC because the farm group’s 
organizers, though enthusiastic, had little actual experience with 
collective bargaining. As a consequence, the BHLC and NFO came 
to see each other as natural allies.44 
 The BHLC and NFO’s collaboration resulted in the formation 
of a Farm-Labor Association in 1956. John Cooney, president of 
the BHLC from 1956 to 1965, described how farmer-labor organ-
izing in Black Hawk County and surrounding areas of northeast 
Iowa worked: 
Well, what happened, you know, the farmers would have one of 
their meetings and invite somebody from labor to come there and 
talk. Maybe they would have a hog roast, and they’d invite so many 
of us to come there. So ﬁnally we sat down and, well, if we can sit 
and talk here why can’t we sit down at the table and talk business. 
We found out there was very little that we couldn’t support that 
they were passing, and vice versa. 
Paul Larsen, executive secretary of the BHLC from 1956 to 1965, 
elaborated on the origins of the Farm-Labor Association: 
[The NFO] came to various elements of the labor movement want-
ing to know how to organize, wanting to work with and use the 
expertise of the labor movement. There were a number of people 
that were very active in the labor movement at that time that had 
had prior experience working with organizing farm groups too. [As 
a result of this collaboration], that was the ﬁrst time that they came 
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up with the slogan, “Collective bargaining in the marketplace.” 
That was the ﬁrst time that any farm organization had done really 
anything toward the idea of bargaining for their prices rather than 
going in and taking [what] was being offered.45 
 In places other than Black Hawk County, Iowa’s farmers and 
urban laborers were drawn closer together politically during the 
middle and late 1950s by several speciﬁc concerns that ultimately 
bore fruit for the Democrats in several state races, most notably 
the governor’s race in 1956. After several years of rising sur-
pluses and declining prices, farmers balked at U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson’s proposal to combat the problem 
with ﬂexible price supports. Even Iowa’s Republican governor 
Leo Hoegh castigated Benson’s proposal, which cost Hoegh the 
support of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. The Democratic 
candidate for governor, Herschel Loveless, beneﬁted not only 
from this issue, but also two others, namely Hoegh’s passage of 
a half-percent increase in the state sales tax and his strong sup-
port for blocking the serving of liquor by the drink. The IMA 
joined Loveless in criticizing the higher sales tax. Moreover, vot-
ers in Iowa’s urban areas, where slightly more than one-half of 
the state’s population now lived in 1956, endorsed liberalizing 
the state’s alcohol laws.46 
 With a considerable war chest now available from the state 
AFL-CIO, combined with Democratic party resources and the 
support of farmers and anti-tax backers, Loveless carried the 
election, becoming only the fourth Democrat elected governor in 
Iowa since the Civil War. Election results conﬁrm that Loveless 
won his greatest support in cities of 25,000 to 50,000 population 
and farm townships. The state’s medium and large industrial cit-
ies were now Democratic strongholds, largely accounting for the 
second-stage gain that James Sundquist describes for the Demo-
cratic realignment in Iowa that peaked between 1954 and 1958. 
Two years later in 1958, similar issues and the same constituencies 
propelled Loveless to another term as governor and Democrats 
even took four of the state’s eight U.S. congressional seats. In the 
state legislature, the Democrats increased their representation in 
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both the house and senate. For Wapello County, Mincks won a 
seat in the senate, which he would retain through 1966, while 
Dean Aubrey and Robert Conner, another UAW Local 74 mem-
ber, won places in the house. Ottumwa Democrat Gene Glenn 
took over Mincks’s seat from 1966 to 1974. In fact, from 1944 to 
1972, Wapello County Democrats won twenty-one of the thirty 
total seats contested for the state house.47 
 Loveless made good on his campaign to repeal the half-cent 
sales tax increase, and along with increasing state social services 
and appointing professionals to various state commissions, he 
then made reapportionment the main focus of his term. In his 
address to the IFL convention in 1957, Loveless emphasized how 
urban groups, especially organized labor, must be better repre- 
sented in state politics. Loveless spoke before the IFL convention 
every year he was in ofﬁce, and consistently stressed a similar 
message underpinned by statistics on the shift in Iowa’s popula-
tion from rural to urban locations. In his 1957 address, for in-
stance, he noted how the twenty-six less heavily populated sen-
atorial districts contained about one-third of Iowa’s population 
while the other twenty-four districts comprised about two-thirds 
of the population. Unless reapportionment occurred, establish-
ment of union shop contracts and improvements in unemploy-
ment and workmen’s compensation could not occur. Although 
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not speciﬁcally named in this speech, the Farm Bureau, espe-
cially, together with the IMA, hoped to blunt the urban shift in 
reapportionment as much as possible through a proposal re-
ferred to as the Shaff Plan, after Senator David O. Shaff of Clin-
ton, that called for a state senate based on population and a house 
based on area. An attempt by the IFL, the League of Women Vot- 
ers, the urban press, and the Democratic party to gain reappor-
tionment by making the issue a constitutional convention refer-
endum in 1960 narrowly failed after the IMA and Farm Bureau 
combined to spend nearly $2 million to campaign against it while 
the IFL and League of Women Voters spent just $100,000.48 
 Although 1960 was a disappointing year for Democrats in 
Iowa, especially for Loveless who lost his race for the U.S. Senate 
after spending more time campaigning for John F. Kennedy than 
himself, the election results indicated that cities of over 10,000 
population were now solidly in the Democratic camp. Historian 
Harlan Hahn’s ﬁndings indicate that the traditional role of farm 
townships in casting deciding albeit protest votes for Democrats 
from the 1930s to mid-1950s was still present after 1958 but less 
important than the strong support for Democrats in the larger 
cities. Jack McCoy, as the IFL’s COPE director, also laid the 
groundwork for Democratic gains in the 1960s by establishing 
local-level COPE programs that were then integrated with the 
state’s programs.49 
 The fruits of the IFL’s political efforts can be seen in the suc-
cess of Democratic governor, then U.S. senator, Harold Hughes 
throughout the 1960s as well as in Democratic gains in both the 
state and national legislature following the IFL’s successful lead-
ership in the reapportionment battle. Hughes initially attracted 
Herschel Loveless’s attention through his work with the Iowa 
Better Trucking Bureau. After changing parties at Loveless’s 
prompting, Hughes successfully ran for one of the state commerce 
commission seats in 1958. A direct, outspoken, and charismatic 
trucker turned politician, Hughes won the 1962 gubernatorial 
election by calling for action on the issues of reapportionment 
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and liquor by the drink. In addition to weak stands on liquor 
reform, Republican governor Norman Erbe had irritated urban 
Democratic voters by standing by while his lieutenant governor, 
William Mooty, cast the deciding vote in allowing the passage of 
the Shaff Plan in 1961. During Hughes’s ﬁrst term, Iowa’s liquor 
laws were repealed and the IFL ﬁled suit in federal court in Des 
Moines in 1963, challenging the constitutionality of the Shaff 
Plan’s reapportionment scheme. The court refused to act on the 
plan’s constitutionality until after a statewide referendum was 
held on December 3, 1963. Following a statewide campaign 
against it by Hughes, organized labor and urban voters in gen-
eral won an enormous victory when the Shaff Plan was defeated 
by a margin of 59 to 41 percent. The most overwhelming opposi-
tion to the plan came in the seventeen counties containing cities 
of more than 10,000 population. Wapello, Polk, Woodbury, Linn, 
and Black Hawk County voters, all home to signiﬁcant numbers 
of union members, rejected it by over 80 percent majorities. Farm 
townships in nineteen predominantly rural counties, in contrast, 
supported the plan by a 70 percent margin. In a special session 
of the 1964 state legislature, a new temporary apportionment 
plan was passed that gave signiﬁcant increases to urban areas in 
both the house and senate. A ﬁnal, more equitable reapportion-
ment plan, mandated by the federal district court in Des Moines, 
was ﬁnally implemented by the state legislature in 1969 and re-
vised by the state supreme court in 1972.50 
 Having deemed reapportionment “the most important proj-
ect that the Iowa labor movement had ever undertaken,” IFL ex-
ecutive vice president Jake Mincks, McCoy’s successor as IFL 
COPE chair, claimed without hyperbole that the Shaff Plan had 
been defeated because of trade union inﬂuence. Certainly labor 
unionist funding had been vital. Following McCoy’s campaign 
to make COPE more effective on the local level, the 1962 IFL con-
vention had passed an increase in the per-capita tax, bringing it 
up to ten cents per member per month. Mincks noted in his 1965 
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report to the IFL convention that in terms of state and national 
legislation much had been accomplished. Because of Democratic 
majorities in the state house and senate—101 of the 124 seats in 
the house and 35 of the 53 seats in the senate—“we were able to 
make gains that we hadn’t been able to make in recent years.” 
Among many improvements, Mincks listed a 25 percent increase 
in the disability beneﬁts of workmen’s compensation, positive 
changes in the unemployment compensation formula and wait-
ing period, and passage of a Fair Employment Practices Act. A 
bill to legalize the union shop made it through the house but was 
defeated by four votes in the senate.51 
 In addition to these victories and helped by Democratic con-
trol of the state legislature from 1964 to 1968, the IFL and its Dem-
ocratic allies pushed for and won annual salaries for legislators, 
encouraged more blue-collar citizens to run for ofﬁce, and gained 
a strong workmen’s compensation act, unemployment compen-
sation, Iowa’s OSHA law, and postcard registration during the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Although some members among the IFL 
blamed Hughes for not pushing harder for the union shop bill, a 
criticism Hughes strongly rejected in his speech to the IFL con-
vention the next year, in 1965 he helped to settle a UPWA strike 
at the new Iowa Beef Processors plant in Fort Dodge. At the 1968 
IFL convention, Hughes cited some of the gains made for work-
ing people during his six years as Iowa’s governor, including im-
provements in workmen’s and unemployment compensation, 
industrial development, greater school aid, property tax relief, 
abolishment of the death penalty, improvements in state govern-
ment organization and planning, increased highway patrol and 
trafﬁc safety programs, and more state facilities for the mentally 
ill and physically handicapped. Moreover, even when the 1968 
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elections swept many Iowa Democrats out of state and national 
legislative ofﬁces, the consolidation of the state’s Democratic 
party organization in the late 1960s and early 1970s helped it to 
bounce back during the 1970s. After Hughes’s election to the U.S. 
Senate in 1968, and establishment of a progressive record there, 
another progressive Democratic, John Culver, a ten-year veteran 
of the U.S. House, was elected in his place. Culver’s former aide, 
Dick Clark, was elected to the other Senate seat in 1972. By the 
mid-1970s, Democrats were also back in control of both houses of 
the Iowa legislature. Although the Democrats’ power has eroded 
since the 1970s, Iowa remains a competitive two-party state.52 
 By the mid-1960s, labor’s political efforts had refashioned 
local Democratic parties in Iowa’s industrial cities. Paul Larsen 
recalled how “[the BHLC] was very effective politically in en-
dorsing and ﬁnancially supporting  candidates for the . . . state 
legislative ofﬁces. And as a result of that, we were able to gain a 
great deal of inﬂuence that we had not had with members of the 
State Legislature from rural areas.” The impact of the BHLC’s 
political activities “started to show up in the elections of 1958 
[when] we started to elect some people locally to the State Legis-
lature for the ﬁrst time. This improved in 1960 and 1962.” When 
Black Hawk County went Democratic in 1964 for the ﬁrst time 
since before the Civil War “folks down there thought it was the 
end of the world.” John Cooney was even more blunt about the 
impact of organized labor on local Democratic politics: 
Well, as far as I’m concerned, the Black Hawk Labor Council was 
the local Democratic party. We put a lot of money into it. We had 
good representation in this area. We encouraged a lot of people to 
get mixed into politics that had never thought of doing it, simply 
because, you know, they were knowledgeable people.53 
 Cooney also stressed that the BHLC built its Democratic 
coalition in Waterloo by involving itself in civil rights. Indeed, 
Waterloo established one of the ﬁrst Fair Employment Practice 
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Commissions in the United States during this period. The BHLC 
actually built on the antidiscrimination and civil rights efforts of 
UPWA Local 46 at Waterloo’s large Rath packing plant. Local 46 
established its antidiscrimination program in 1950 and especially 
combated the segregation of African American women in the 
plant. The local also fought segregation in Waterloo beginning in 
1953, and when the BHLC was formed, worked with the county-
wide labor council to do the same. Besides the establishment of 
the Fair Employment Practices Commission, the BHLC started 
the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for educating blacks of all ages. 
These anti-discrimination and civil rights initiatives solidiﬁed a 
cross-racial Democratic base in Waterloo.54 
 Without organized labor’s involvement, Iowa would not have 
become a true two-party state by the 1960s. Beginning with ag-
gressive local union efforts during the 1940s in Ottumwa and 
prompted by the Iowa State Industrial Council’s political efforts 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, voters in Iowa’s manufacturing 
centers steadily turned toward the Democrats. Helped by coop-
erative efforts with sympathetic farmers, Democrats made steady 
gains in state and national representation after the mid-1950s. 
Despite its national reputation as a conservative farm state, Ottum-
wa’s union leaders along with the state’s CIO movement prompted 
Iowa’s belated participation in the New Deal political transition 
and established the state’s modern Democratic foundations. 
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